NBER Macroeconomics Annual 1999, Volume 14 by Ben S. Bernanke & Julio J. Rotemberg
This PDF is a selection from an out-of-print volume from the National
Bureau of Economic Research
Volume Title: NBER Macroeconomics Annual 1999, Volume 14




Conference Date: March 26-27, 1999
Publication Date: January 2000
Chapter Title: Editorial in "NBER Macroeconomics Annual 1999, Volume
14"
Chapter Author: Ben S. Bernanke, Julio J. Rotemberg
Chapter URL: http://www.nber.org/chapters/c11043
Chapter pages in book: (p. 1 - 6)Editorial,  NBER  Macroeconomics 
Annual  1999 
This volume  of  the  NBER Macroeconomics  Annual focuses  primarily  on 
explantions  of current notable macroeconomic  phenomena.  Some of the 
papers also discuss policy responses.  In particular, the paper by Jonathan 
Parker tries to understand  the increase in the consumption-to-GDP  ratio 
in the United States, the paper by John Heaton and Deborah Lucas tries to 
explain  the rise in U.S.  asset prices, the paper by Fernando Alvarez and 
Marcelo Veracierto seeks to rationalize unemployment  in European coun- 
tries, and the paper by Takeo Hoshi and Anil Kashyap explores the causes 
and implications  of the Japanese banking  crisis. The other papers in the 
volume  deal  with  international  financial  and  economic  crises: Roberto 
Chang and Andres  Velasco propose  a theory of liquidity crises in emerg- 
ing markets and derive its policy implications,  while  Michael Mussa and 
Miguel Savastano discuss  the IMF approach to dealing with stabilization 
and balance-of-payments  crises. 
The recent increases in both consumption  and asset prices in the United 
States are related, because the latter is often used to rationalize the former. 
There is little doubt that a stock-market crash would  dampen  consumer 
spending.  However,  there is also an undeniable  tension  between  expla- 
nations  of the two phenomena.  For example,  one potential  explanation 
for the rise in consumption  is that people  have become  more impatient. 
On the other hand, an increase in impatience would  normally require that 
asset prices fall, so that people  would be willing to hold on to their assets. 
Thus, a potential explanation  for the increase in asset prices is that people 
have become  more  patient.  One common  feature of the papers by Parker 
and by Heaton  and Lucas is that they both dismiss  monocausal  explana- 
tions of the rises in consumption  and asset prices, respectively, attributing 
these  phenomena  instead  to a combination  of factors. 
Parker is able to cast doubt  on a number  of the single-cause  explana- 2 *  BERNANKE  & ROTEMBERG 
tions  that have  been  offered  for the rise in the ratio of consumption  to 
income.  These  include  the changes  in the age composition  of the popu- 
lation,  changes  in  government  tax,  transfer  and  spending  policies, 
changes  in  access  to  credit,  and,  mostly  notably,  the  aforementioned 
increase  in  asset  prices.  Parker in  fact  offers  both  timing  and  cross- 
section  regression  evidence  that  the  increase  in  asset  prices  has  rela- 
tively  little to do with  the consumption  boom.  By contrast,  the possibil- 
ity that increased  impatience  accounts  for the  increase  in consumption 
cannot  be ruled  out,  particularly as we  have  recently  seen  increases  in 
real interest  rates  on  fixed-income  securities  that  exceed  even  the  in- 
crease in the rate of growth  of consumption. 
Heaton  and Lucas take aim at the claim that the stock-market boom in 
the United States can be explained  by increases in stock-market participa- 
tion.  They  point  out  that,  even  though  many  more  individuals  hold 
some  stocks,  the  bulk  of  shares  in publicly  traded  companies  are still 
held by a very small fraction of the population.  They also cast doubt  on 
other  single-cause  explanations  of  asset  price  increases,  including  the 
suggestions  that  they  reflect  expected  higher  earnings  growth  or  in- 
creased  patience.  However,  by combining  the various explanations,  and 
in particular by giving  a large role to increases in average diversification 
brought  about  by  the  explosive  growth  in  mutual  funds  (which  they 
model  in  a novel  way),  the  authors  can account  quantitatively  for the 
increase  in U.S.  stock  prices.  In his  discussion,  John Campbell  argues 
that for the  story to work  diversification  would  need  to have  increased 
for  the  richest  wealthholders  as  well,  and  he  wonders  whether  this 
occurred in practice. This is now  left as an important question  for future 
research. 
The volume  includes  two  papers  on  crises  in financial  markets.  The 
first, by Hoshi  and Kashyap,  is a study  of the origins  and likely  future 
evolution  of the  problems  of the  Japanese banking  system.  Hoshi  and 
Kashyap  argue  that,  as  in  the  case  of many  other banking  crises,  the 
origins  of  this  problem  can be  traced  to  financial  deregulation.  In the 
Japanese  case,  this led the banks' best  customers  to borrow  elsewhere. 
The authors  show  that much  of the cross-sectional  distribution  of bank 
returns in Japan can be explained  by the degree to which banks relied on 
large  corporate  customers  who  defected  to  the  capital  markets  when 
deregulation  permitted.  A key question  at this point is whether Japanese 
banks'  fortunes  can be expected  to improve  over time without  much  in 
the  way  of  government  help.  This  would  be  possible,  for instance,  if 
future bank profits  could  be  expected  to cover  some  of the  losses  that 
have yet to be recognized  formally. 
Hoshi  and  Kashyap  argue  forcefully  against  the  optimistic  view,  on Editorial 3 
the basis  of two  pieces  of evidence.  First, a rereading  of the accounting 
evidence  suggests  to them that the magnitude  of Japanese bank losses  is 
very  large.  Second,  they  expect  the Japanese banking  system  to shrink 
over  time,  rather than grow.  The main basis  for this conclusion  is that 
they expect financial-market  deregulation  to lead Japanese borrowers  to 
become  as dependent  on banks as U.S. borrowers  are. Since many firms 
in  Japan still  rely  on  bank  financing  to  a larger extent  than  similarly 
placed U.S. firms, the implication  is that bank lending  in Japan will begin 
to shrink substantially. Thus there is little chance that the bad-loan prob- 
lem  of Japanese banks  will  cure itself  without  substantial  outside  help. 
As the discussants  emphasized,  the future  of Japanese banks would  be 
much  brighter  if they  could  expect  to  increase  their fee  income  to  the 
extent  that U.S. banks have  done.  Hoshi  and Kashyap  suggest  that this 
is one respect where,  unfortunately,  the institutions  in the two countries 
do not appear to be converging,  as Japanese banks still derive very little 
of their income  from fees. 
The second  paper on financial-market  crises is by Chang and Velasco, 
who  focus on recent financial problems  in emerging  markets. The aim of 
their paper is to discuss  the properties of these crises as well as the policy 
implications  derived  by  considering  a  very  specific  interpretation  of 
these  crises.  In particular,  motivated  by  the  observation  that many  of 
these  crises  occurred  in situations  where  countries'  reserves  were  low 
relative  to their short-term loans  from abroad, Chang  and Velasco con- 
sider a theoretical setting in which  the crises are essentially  the results of 
bank runs.  Foreigners  lend  funds  to banks in emerging  markets, which 
in turn use  the  funds  to finance  illiquid  investments.  If domestic  resi- 
dents  run on  the banks,  then  the  investments  must  be liquidated,  the 
returns are low, and foreigners  cannot all be repaid. 
Chang  and Velasco use  a model  that has  much  in common  with  the 
celebrated  Diamond-Dybvig  model  of bank  runs.  However,  their  set- 
ting  differs  in  that,  unlike  a  central  bank  in  a  closed  economy,  the 
government  of  a  small  open  economy  cannot  act  as  a  lender  of  last 
resort if the exchange  rate is fixed,  or if all transactions  are carried out 
in  foreign  currency.  It is  for  this  reason  that  regulatory  interventions 
can be much  more  appealing  in the  open-economy  context.  For exam- 
ple,  an emerging-market  government  may wish  to encourage  domestic 
banks  to  borrow  long-term  even  though  individual  banks  prefer  to 
borrow  short-term.  The reason  is a type  of externality,  arising because 
individual  banks  ignore  the  effects  of  their  increased  short-term  bor- 
rowing  on  the  likelihood  of a run on  the  entire banking  system.  Simi- 
larly, Chang  and Velasco show  that financial-market  liberalization  may 
make emerging  economies  more vulnerable  to runs.  The exchange-rate 4 ' BERNANKE  & ROTEMBERG 
regime  also  has  implications  for  the  financial  fragility  studied  in  this 
paper:  In particular,  the  existence  of  flexible  exchange  rates,  together 
with  the  requirement  that  domestic  residents  make  their  deposits  in 
domestic  currency, makes  it possible  for emerging-market  governments 
to  act  as  lenders  of  last  resort  after  all.  Under  these  conditions 
the  government  can  respond  to  an  impending  run  by  printing  the 
requisite  domestic  currency,  then  allowing  the  currency  to  depreciate. 
In the Chang-Velasco  model  this strategy avoids  runs altogether. 
Several  commentators  noted  that  these  issues  of  financial  fragility 
were  not  central  in  Mussa  and  Savastano's  discussion  of  the  IMF ap- 
proach  to economic  stabilization.  Rather, their paper  suggests  that the 
IMF views  the  countries  that  seek  its  support  as requiring  changes  in 
"fundamentals,"  so that their current-account  financing problems  do not 
recur. The required  changes  in fundamentals  involve  fiscal and  mone- 
tary contractions as well as reforms of institutions.  The liberalization that 
lies at the heart of many  of the proposed  institutional  reforms is seen  as 
necessary  to  increase  sustainable  growth.  The paper  spends  relatively 
little  time  defending  these  specific  institutional  reforms  against  their 
critics,  however.  Rather,  the  paper  deals  explicitly  with  several  other 
criticisms  of IMF programs.  It argues,  for example,  that IMF programs 
are not all identical; for example,  the magnitudes  of fiscal and monetary 
adjustments  that are proposed  differ by country. The paper emphasizes 
that, in addition,  IMF programs react flexibly to evolving  circumstances. 
Initial IMF targets  are not  rigidly  maintained  over  time  but  rather are 
allowed  to change  as new  information  accumulates.  Mexico's  successful 
adjustment  to  the  1994 crisis,  for  example,  involved  the  violation  of 
several interim program targets. 
The authors  see the need  for fiscal contraction as relatively noncontro- 
versial,  because  it improves  the  current  account  by  reducing  imports. 
That these  contractions can also reduce the feasible repayment  to foreign 
creditors by reducing  asset values  is recognized  indirectly, by acknowl- 
edging  that the required fiscal adjustments  are sometimes  modest.  Still, 
the  extent  to  which  the  IMF takes  this  problem  into  account  is  quite 
controversial.  The lack of a precise  formula by which  fiscal adjustments 
are set,  while  probably  a strength  given  the myriad  considerations  that 
make each country a special case, naturally complicates  the judgment  of 
whether  the IMF staff is giving these  considerations  their proper weight. 
Mussa  and Savastano  recognize  that the domestic  credit creation tar- 
gets  are more controversial.  One  reason for this is that one cannot fore- 
cast future credit creation (or money  growth) without  a model  for money 
demand,  and  estimated  money  demand  curves  have  large  residuals. 
They thus take pains  to argue that these  targets are not rigidly adhered Editorial 5 
to  as circumstances  change.  Since  there  has  been  a shift  (in both  aca- 
demic  discourse  and  central  bank  practice)  back  towards  thinking  of 
monetary  policy  in  terms  of  interest  rates,  the  IMF might  be  able  to 
silence  this criticism at low  cost by describing  its suggestions  for mone- 
tary policy  in these  terms.  It might  then  be easier to communicate  that 
the  IMF cannot  accept  blame  simultaneously  for raising  interest  rates 
and  for allowing  currencies  to  devalue,  given  that it sees  interest-rate 
increases  as the only short-term method  for preventing  depreciation. 
Alvarez  and  Veracierto return  to  a topic  that has  long  occupied  the 
Macro Annual,  namely  the  increase  in  European  unemployment.  The 
authors try to deduce  the importance  of European labor-market policies 
by studying  these  within  a simple  calibrated model  of search,  in which 
unemployed  individuals  are indifferent  between  searching  and staying 
out of the labor force altogether.  They focus,  in particular, on minimum 
wages,  increases  in wages  brought  about by  unions,  firing  taxes,  and 
unemployment  insurance.  Even  setting  the  minimum  wage  so  that  it 
covers  90% of the average  wage  has very little effect on unemployment 
in  the  model.  Minimum  wages  might  well  have  larger  effects  if  the 
model  were  extended  so that workers would  not all earn the same wage 
in  the  absence  of  the  search  frictions.  While  unions  also  raise  wages, 
they  raise  wages  for everyone,  and  the  result  is  that they  have  much 
larger effects  on  unemployment.  One  attractive feature of the  authors' 
model  with  unions  is that it can easily  match both the size  of the union 
wage  premium  and the fraction of the U.S.  workforce  that is employed 
by unions. 
As in many previous  studies,  firing taxes are found  to have relatively 
modest  effects  on unemployment,  because  they  discourage  both hiring 
and firing. By contrast, unemployment  insurance  acts as a firing subsidy 
in  this  model.  It thus  leads  to a substantial  increase  in the  number  of 
temporary  withdrawals  from  work  that  are rewarded  by  the  govern- 
ment.  While  this  means  that UI has  a large  effect  on  unemployment, 
Alvarez  and Veracierto show  that the effects  implied  by their model  are 
similar in magnitude  to those  estimated  by Nickell  (1997) using  a cross 
section  of countries.  The fact that such strong policy  conclusions  follow 
from  such  a  stripped-down  model  led  many  commentators  to  worry 
about  the  robustness  of the  results.  It was  generally  agreed,  however, 
that the advantage  of the broad modeling  framework of the paper is that 
it  can  be  modified  to  study  many  aspects  of  the  labor  market  while 
providing  a range of testable implications. 
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